ISBN: 9780511654572

This book proposes an institutionally embedded framework for analyzing voter choice.Voters, Orit Kedar argues, are concerned with policy, and therefore their vote reflects the path set by… Meer...

This book proposes an institutionally embedded framework for analyzing voter choice.Voters, Orit Kedar argues, are concerned with policy, and therefore their vote reflects the path set by political institutions leading from votes to policy.Under this framework, the more institutional mechanisms facilitating post-electoral compromise are built into the political process (e.g., multi-party government), the more voters compensate for the dilution of their vote.This simple but overlooked principle allows Kedar to explain a broad array of seemingly unrelated electoral regularities and offer a unified framework of analysis, which she terms compensatory vote.Kedar develops the compensatory logic in three electoral arenas: parliamentary, presidential, and federal.Leveraging on institutional variation in the degree of power sharing, she analyzes voter choice, conducting an empirical analysis that brings together institutional and behavioral data in a broad cross section of elections in democracies.; PDF; Politics, Philosphy & Religion > Politics & government > Comparative politics, Cambridge University Press<

2009, ISBN: 9780511654572

How Voters Compensate for Power Sharing, eBooks, eBook Download (PDF), Auflage, This book proposes an institutionally embedded framework for analyzing voter choice. Voters, Orit Kedar arg… Meer...

How Voters Compensate for Power Sharing, eBooks, eBook Download (PDF), Auflage, This book proposes an institutionally embedded framework for analyzing voter choice. Voters, Orit Kedar argues, are concerned with policy, and therefore their vote reflects the path set by political institutions leading from votes to policy. Under this framework, the more institutional mechanisms facilitating post-electoral compromise are built into the political process (e.g., multi-party government), the more voters compensate for the dilution of their vote. This simple but overlooked principle allows Kedar to explain a broad array of seemingly unrelated electoral regularities and offer a unified framework of analysis, which she terms compensatory vote. Kedar develops the compensatory logic in three electoral arenas: parliamentary, presidential, and federal. Leveraging on institutional variation in the degree of power sharing, she analyzes voter choice, conducting an empirical analysis that brings together institutional and behavioral data in a broad cross section of elections in democracies. [PU: Cambridge University Press], [ED: 1], Cambridge University Press, 2009<

2009, ISBN: 9780511654572

This book proposes an institutionally embedded framework for analyzing voter choice. Voters, Orit Kedar argues, are concerned with policy, and therefore their vote reflects the path set b… Meer...

This book proposes an institutionally embedded framework for analyzing voter choice. Voters, Orit Kedar argues, are concerned with policy, and therefore their vote reflects the path set by political institutions leading from votes to policy. Under this framework, the more institutional mechanisms facilitating post-electoral compromise are built into the political process (e.g., multi-party government), the more voters compensate for the dilution of their vote. This simple but overlooked principle allows Kedar to explain a broad array of seemingly unrelated electoral regularities and offer a unified framework of analysis, which she terms compensatory vote. Kedar develops the compensatory logic in three electoral arenas: parliamentary, presidential, and federal. Leveraging on institutional variation in the degree of power sharing, she analyzes voter choice, conducting an empirical analysis that brings together institutional and behavioral data in a broad cross section of elections in democracies. eBook 14.12.2009, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press<

ISBN: 9780511654572

*Voting for Policy Not Parties* - How Voters Compensate for Power Sharing / pdf eBook für 25.99 € / Aus dem Bereich: eBooks, Belletristik, Erzählungen Medien > Bücher nein eBook als pdf e… Meer...

*Voting for Policy Not Parties* - How Voters Compensate for Power Sharing / pdf eBook für 25.99 € / Aus dem Bereich: eBooks, Belletristik, Erzählungen Medien > Bücher nein eBook als pdf eBooks > Belletristik > Erzählungen, Cambridge University Press<

2009, ISBN: 9780511654572

How Voters Compensate for Power Sharing, eBooks, eBook Download (PDF), Auflage, [PU: Cambridge University Press], [ED: 1], Cambridge University Press, 2009