ISBN: 9781402086984

ISBN-13: 9781402086984, 978-1402086984. Needless to say, I think this is a pity. Non-Bayesian positions deserve to be examined with much greater care, and the present work is an attempt t… Meer...

ISBN-13: 9781402086984, 978-1402086984. Needless to say, I think this is a pity. Non-Bayesian positions deserve to be examined with much greater care, and the present work is an attempt to defend what I believe to be a coherent and reasonably detailed non-Bayesian account of decision theory. Non-Bayesian Decision Theory Please note: this item is printed on demand and will take extra time before it can be dispatched to you (up to 20 working days).Beliefs and Desires as Reasons for ActionAuthor(s): Martin PetersonFormat: HardbackPublisher: Springer-Verlag New York Inc., United StatesImprint: Springer-Verlag New York Inc.ISBN-13: 9781402086984, 978-1402086984SynopsisFor quite some time, philosophers, economists, and statisticians have endorsed a view on rational choice known as Bayesianism. The work on this book has grown out of a feeling that the Bayesian view has come to dominate the academic com- nitytosuchanextentthatalternative,non-Bayesianpositionsareseldomextensively researched. Needless to say, I think this is a pity. Non-Bayesian positions deserve to be examined with much greater care, and the present work is an attempt to defend what I believe to be a coherent and reasonably detailed non-Bayesian account of decision theory. The main thesis I defend can be summarised as follows. Rational agents m- imise subjective expected utility, but contrary to what is claimed by Bayesians, ut- ity and subjective probability should not be de?ned in terms of preferences over uncertain prospects. On the contrary, rational decision makers need only consider preferences over certain outcomes. It will be shown that utility and probability fu- tions derived in a non-Bayesian manner can be used for generating preferences over uncertain prospects, that support the principle of maximising subjective expected utility. To some extent, this non-Bayesian view gives an account of what modern - cision theory could have been like, had decision theorists not entered the Bayesian path discovered by Ramsey, de Finetti, Savage, and others. I will not discuss all previous non-Bayesian positions presented in the literature., Neu, Festpreisangebot, [LT: FixedPrice], Book Title: Non-Bayesian Decision Theory, Subject Area: Data Analysis, Publication Name: Non-Bayesian Decision Theory: Beliefs and Desires As Reasons for Action, Subject: Economics, Computer Science, Science, Mathematics, Management, Publication Year: 2008, Type: Textbook, Format: Hardcover, Language: English, Item Height: 235mm, Item Width: 155mm, Item Weight: 950g, Number of Pages: 170 Pages, Springer-Verlag NY Inc.<

2008, ISBN: 1402086989

[EAN: 9781402086984], Neubuch, [SC: 0.0], [PU: SPRINGER NATURE], SCIENCE; COMPUTERS / COMPUTER MATHEMATICS GAME THEORY; SCIENCE PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL ASPECTS, Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Pr… Meer...

[EAN: 9781402086984], Neubuch, [SC: 0.0], [PU: SPRINGER NATURE], SCIENCE; COMPUTERS / COMPUTER MATHEMATICS GAME THEORY; SCIENCE PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL ASPECTS, Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - For quite some time, philosophers, economists, and statisticians have endorsed a view on rational choice known as Bayesianism. The work on this book has grown out of a feeling that the Bayesian view has come to dominate the academic com- nitytosuchanextentthatalternative,non-Bayesianpositionsareseldomextensively researched. Needless to say, I think this is a pity. Non-Bayesian positions deserve to be examined with much greater care, and the present work is an attempt to defend what I believe to be a coherent and reasonably detailed non-Bayesian account of decision theory. The main thesis I defend can be summarised as follows. Rational agents m- imise subjective expected utility, but contrary to what is claimed by Bayesians, ut- ity and subjective probability should not be de ned in terms of preferences over uncertain prospects. On the contrary, rational decision makers need only consider preferences over certain outcomes. It will be shown that utility and probability fu- tions derived in a non-Bayesian manner can be used for generating preferences over uncertain prospects, that support the principle of maximising subjective expected utility. To some extent, this non-Bayesian view gives an account of what modern - cision theory could have been like, had decision theorists not entered the Bayesian path discovered by Ramsey, de Finetti, Savage, and others. I will not discuss all previous non-Bayesian positions presented in the literature., Books<

ISBN: 9781402086984

For quite some time, philosophers, economists, and statisticians have endorsed a view on rational choice known as Bayesianism. The work on this book has grown out of a feeling that the Ba… Meer...

For quite some time, philosophers, economists, and statisticians have endorsed a view on rational choice known as Bayesianism. The work on this book has grown out of a feeling that the Bayesian view has come to dominate the academic com- nity to such an extent that alternative, non-Bayesian positions are seldom extensively researched. Needless to say, I think this is a pity. Non-Bayesian positions deserve to be examined with much greater care, and the present work is an attempt to defend what I believe to be a coherent and reasonably detailed non-Bayesian account of decision theory. The main thesis I defend can be summarised as follows. Rational agents m- imise subjective expected utility, but contrary to what is claimed by Bayesians, ut- ity and subjective probability should not be defined in terms of preferences over uncertain prospects. On the contrary, rational decision makers need only consider preferences over certain outcomes. It will be shown that utility and probability fu- tions derived in a non-Bayesian manner can be used for generating preferences over uncertain prospects, that support the principle of maximising subjective expected utility. To some extent, this non-Bayesian view gives an account of what modern - cision theory could have been like, had decision theorists not entered the Bayesian path discovered by Ramsey, de Finetti, Savage, and others. I will not discuss all previous non-Bayesian positions presented in the literature. New Textbooks>Hardcover>Science>Hist & Phil of Science>Hist,Phil of Science, Springer Netherlands Core >2 >T<

ISBN: 9781402086984

For quite some time, philosophers, economists, and statisticians have endorsed a view on rational choice known as Bayesianism. The work on this book has grown out of a feeling that the Ba… Meer...

For quite some time, philosophers, economists, and statisticians have endorsed a view on rational choice known as Bayesianism. The work on this book has grown out of a feeling that the Bayesian view has come to dominate the academic com- nitytosuchanextentthatalternative,non-Bayesianpositionsareseldomextensively researched. Needless to say, I think this is a pity. Non-Bayesian positions deserve to be examined with much greater care, and the present work is an attempt to defend what I believe to be a coherent and reasonably detailed non-Bayesian account of decision theory. The main thesis I defend can be summarised as follows. Rational agents m- imise subjective expected utility, but contrary to what is claimed by Bayesians, ut- ity and subjective probability should not be de?ned in terms of preferences over uncertain prospects. On the contrary, rational decision makers need only consider preferences over certain outcomes. It will be shown that utility and probability fu- tions derived in a non-Bayesian manner can be used for generating preferences over uncertain prospects, that support the principle of maximising subjective expected utility. To some extent, this non-Bayesian view gives an account of what modern - cision theory could have been like, had decision theorists not entered the Bayesian path discovered by Ramsey, de Finetti, Savage, and others. I will not discuss all previous non-Bayesian positions presented in the literature., Springer<

2008, ISBN: 9781402086984

*Non-Bayesian Decision Theory* - Beliefs and Desires as Reasons for Action. 2008 edition / gebundene Ausgabe für 106.99 € / Aus dem Bereich: Bücher, Wissenschaft, Philosophie Medien > Büc… Meer...

*Non-Bayesian Decision Theory* - Beliefs and Desires as Reasons for Action. 2008 edition / gebundene Ausgabe für 106.99 € / Aus dem Bereich: Bücher, Wissenschaft, Philosophie Medien > Bücher nein Buch (gebunden) Hardcover;Geisteswissenschaften, Kunst, Musik;Allgemeines, Lexika, Springer Nature Singapore<