Thinking and Doing by H. N. Castaneda - gebruikt boek

EAN (ISBN-13): 9789027706102
ISBN (ISBN-10): 9027706107
Gebonden uitgave
Verschijningsjaar: 1981
Uitgever: Springer-Verlag GmbH
384 Bladzijden
Gewicht: 0,748 kg
Taal: eng/Englisch

Boek bevindt zich in het datenbestand sinds 2007-05-14T14:21:11+02:00 (Amsterdam)
Detailpagina laatst gewijzigd op 2023-01-03T09:49:51+01:00 (Amsterdam)
ISBN/EAN: 9027706107

ISBN - alternatieve schrijfwijzen:
90-277-0610-7, 978-90-277-0610-2
alternatieve schrijfwijzen en verwante zoekwoorden:
Auteur van het boek: castaneda, hector neri castañeda
Titel van het boek: philosophical studies, thinking philosophy, thinking and doing the philosophical foundations institutions

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Gegevens van de uitgever

Auteur: Hector-Neri Castañeda
Titel: Philosophical Studies Series; Thinking and Doing - The Philosophical Foundations of Institutions
Uitgeverij: Springer; Springer Netherland
368 Bladzijden
Verschijningsjaar: 1975-09-30
Dordrecht; NL
Gewicht: 1,600 kg
Taal: Engels
246,10 € (DE)
253,00 € (AT)
306,80 CHF (CH)
Not available, publisher indicates OP

BB; Book; Hardcover, Softcover / Philosophie/Allgemeines, Lexika; Philosophie: Epistemologie und Erkenntnistheorie; Verstehen; reason; structure; 15th century; conditional; quantifiers; Immanuel Kant; psychology; identity; nature; truth; opera; semantic; Quotation; metaphysics; English; C; Epistemology; Religion and Philosophy; EA

1: Introduction: Tasks and Problems.- 1. The Foundations of Normative Systems and Institutions.- 2. Practical Thinking.- 3. Our Six Types of Philosophical Problems.- 4. Practical Language.- 5. Conventions on Quotation Marks.- I The Logico-Ontological Structure of the Representational Image of Practical Thinking.- 2: Practical Thinking: Dramatis Personae.- 1. Deliberation.- 2. Propositions.- 3. Mandates.- 4. Prescriptions.- 5. Intentions.- 6. Practitions.- 7. Normatives or Deontic Judgments.- 3: Propositional Structure and Propositional Implication.- 1. Propositional Forms.- 2. Truth.- 3. Reasoning.- 4. Three Approaches to Implication.- A. The Semantical Approach.- 5. Truth-Functional Connections.- 6. English Semantical Connectives.- 7. ‘If’, ‘Only if’, and ‘?’.- 8. Logical Form.- 9. Semantical implication.- 10. Semantical Equivalence.- 11. Logical Truths: Tautologies.- B. The Inferential Approach.- 12. The Nature of the Approach.- 13. Connective Deducibility.- C. Implication and Deducibility.- 14. Equivalence of Implication and Deducibility.- 15. Inferential English Connectives.- D. The Analytic Approach.- 16. The Nature of the Approach.- E. Axioms, Implication, and Deducibility.- 17. The Equivalence of the Three Approaches.- F. Propositional Quantification.- 18. Quantifiers and Propositional Functions.- 19. Semantical Approach.- 20. Set-Theoretical Models.- 21. Inferential Approach to Quantification.- 22. Coincidence of the Three Approaches.- 4: Imperatives and Prescriptions.- 1. Prescriptions and Propositions.- 2. Is There a Logic of Imperatives?.- 3. The Inferential Approach: Pure Prescriptive Compounds.- 4. The Inferential Approach: Conditional Mandates.- 5. The Inferential Approach: General and Mixed Connective Mandates.- 6. The Semantics of Imperative Logic: The Values of Prescriptions.- 7. General and Connective Noematic Implication and Tautologies.- 8. Imperative Quantification.- 9. Set-Theoretical Models for Prescriptional-Propositional Systems.- 5: Imperative Designated Values: Orthotes and Anarthotes.- 1. Orthotes-in-Context-C (A, E).- 2. Endorsement.- 3. Unqualified Orthotes.- 6: Intentions and Intending.- 1. What is Intended is Not an Action.- 2. What is Intended is Not a Proposition: General Argument.- 3. What is Intended is Not a Non-First-Person Proposition.- 4. What is Intended is Not a First-Person Future-Tense Proposition.- 5. Intentions to Bring About.- 6. Intentions as First-Person Practitions.- 7. The Basic Structure of Intentions.- 8. The Legitimacy-Values of Intentions.- 7: Deontic Judgments and Their Implicational Structure.- 1. Deontic Judgments are Propositions.- 2. Deontic Properties.- 3. Deontic Propositions and Mandates.- 4. Enactment.- 5. Conflicts of Duties and the Nature of Promises.- 6. The Unqualified Ought.- 7. Deontic Propositions and Practitions.- 8. Deontic Propositions and Ought-to-be.- 9. Actions, Circumstances and Identifiers.- 10. The Good-Samaritan Paradox.- 11. Contrary-to-Duty Normatives.- 12. The Tenselessness of Obligatoriness.- 13. Conjunctive and Quantified Deontic Propositions.- 14. Consistency of Normative Systems.- 15. Deontic Quantification is Extensional.- 16. Identity and the Extensionality of Deontic Judgments.- 17. The Defeasibility Conditions of Obligation.- 18. A Pause and a Caution.- 8: Deontic Truth.- 1. Deontic Truth as Necessary Legitimacy.- 2. Deontic Truth as Practitional Implication.- 3. Alternative Deontic Worlds: Set Theoretical Models for Deontic Truth.- 9: A Formal System for the Quantificational Logic with Identity of Propositions, Practitions, and Deontic Judgments.- 1. Crucial Facts About Practical Languages.- 2. Basic Deontic Languages Di*.- 3. The Axiomatic Deontic Systems Di**.- 4. Models for the Systems Di**.- 5. The Adequacy, Especially the Extensionality, of D**.- II The Meta-Psychology of Practical Thinking: The Action Schema.- 10: The Internal Causality of Practical Thinking.- 1. Practical or Practitional States of Mind.- 2. Intending as a Bundle or Propensities.- 3. The Practitional Copula and Volitions.- 4. Needs and Desires: Their Minimal Logical Structure.- 5. Wants: Types and Minimal Logical Structure.- 6. The Causality of Prescriptive Thinking.- 11: Oughts and the Reasonableness of Action.- 1. Rational and Reasonable Action.- 2. The First Two Steps Toward Reasonableness.- 3. Oughts and Ideal Wants.- 4. Hypothetical “Imperatives”.- 5. Kant’s Analyticity of Hypothetical Imperatives.- 6. Conflicts of Oughts and the Overriding Ought.- III The Metaphysics of Practical Thinking: The Reality of Doing and of Deontic Properties.- 12: Events and the Structure of Doing.- 1. The Structure of Doing: Its Basic Laws.- 2. Actions, Events, and Processes.- 3. The Confluence of Agency.- 4. The Times of Actions.- 5. The Identification and the Plurality of Actions and Events.- 13: The Autonomy of Practical Thinking and the Non-Natural Character of Practical Noemata.- 1. The Autonomy of Practical Thinking.- 2. Moral Classical Intuitionism and Moral Naturalism Reconciled.- 3. The Non-Natural Character of Deontic “Properties”.- 4. The Dispensability of Deontic “Properties” or Operations.- Index of Names.- Index of Topics.