1999, ISBN: 0792357000

[EAN: 9780792357001], Neubuch, [SC: 0.0], [PU: Springer Netherlands], ETHIK; ETHOS; PHILOSOPHIE / LOGIK; ONTOLOGIE; PHILOSOPHIE; BIBLIOGRAPHY; REASON; TRADITION, Druck auf Anfrage Neuware… Meer...

[EAN: 9780792357001], Neubuch, [SC: 0.0], [PU: Springer Netherlands], ETHIK; ETHOS; PHILOSOPHIE / LOGIK; ONTOLOGIE; PHILOSOPHIE; BIBLIOGRAPHY; REASON; TRADITION, Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - 2 first-person point of view, I acknowledge these possible handicaps and try to overcome them. Other people may coherently judge that I am incapable of figuring out correctly what I rationally ought to do, or they may inform me of reasons of which I had heretofore been ignorant, or they may try to help me overcome intellectual hindrances. Like me, these people would be assuming that the goal is to identify what I really rationally ought to do. Nevertheless, we are concerned with reasons for the agent to act in a certain way, rather than with reasons, say, for someone to want it to be the case that the agent act. Thus to be a reason in our sense is to be a consideration which has an appropriate guiding role to play in the. agents deliberation. (An agent is guided by reasons if she determines what to do in light of the reasons. ) Suppose then that a nor mative theory says that it is supremely desirable, or that it rationally ought to be the case, that agents act in a way that maximizes the general utility, but that (since the general utility is never in fact maximized by those who pay attention to it) considerations of the general utility should play no role in the agents' deliberation. Such a theory would not be said to ascribe to agents a reason to maximize the general utility on our usage. 220 pp. Englisch, Books<

ISBN: 9780792357001

[ED: Buch], [PU: Springer Netherlands], Neuware - 2 first-person point of view, I acknowledge these possible handicaps and try to overcome them. Other people may coherently judge that I a… Meer...

[ED: Buch], [PU: Springer Netherlands], Neuware - 2 first-person point of view, I acknowledge these possible handicaps and try to overcome them. Other people may coherently judge that I am incapable of figuring out correctly what I rationally ought to do, or they may inform me of reasons of which I had heretofore been ignorant, or they may try to help me overcome intellectual hindrances. Like me, these people would be assuming that the goal is to identify what I really rationally ought to do. Nevertheless, we are concerned with reasons for the agent to act in a certain way, rather than with reasons, say, for someone to want it to be the case that the agent act. Thus to be a reason in our sense is to be a consideration which has an appropriate guiding role to play in the. agents deliberation. (An agent is guided by reasons if she determines what to do in light of the reasons. ) Suppose then that a nor mative theory says that it is supremely desirable, or that it rationally ought to be the case, that agents act in a way that maximizes the general utility, but that (since the general utility is never in fact maximized by those who pay attention to it) considerations of the general utility should play no role in the agents' deliberation. Such a theory would not be said to ascribe to agents a reason to maximize the general utility on our usage.- Besorgungstitel - vorauss. Lieferzeit 3-5 Tage., DE, [SC: 2.70], Neuware, gewerbliches Angebot, 241x160x17 mm, 220, [GW: 500g], Banküberweisung, Offene Rechnung, Kreditkarte, PayPal, Offene Rechnung (Vorkasse vorbehalten), Internationaler Versand<

1999, ISBN: 0792357000

[EAN: 9780792357001], Neubuch, [SC: 0.0], [PU: Springer Netherlands], ETHIK; ETHOS; PHILOSOPHIE / LOGIK; ONTOLOGIE; PHILOSOPHIE; BIBLIOGRAPHY; REASON; TRADITION, Druck auf Anfrage Neuware… Meer...

[EAN: 9780792357001], Neubuch, [SC: 0.0], [PU: Springer Netherlands], ETHIK; ETHOS; PHILOSOPHIE / LOGIK; ONTOLOGIE; PHILOSOPHIE; BIBLIOGRAPHY; REASON; TRADITION, Druck auf Anfrage Neuware -2 first-person point of view, I acknowledge these possible handicaps and try to overcome them. Other people may coherently judge that I am incapable of figuring out correctly what I rationally ought to do, or they may inform me of reasons of which I had heretofore been ignorant, or they may try to help me overcome intellectual hindrances. Like me, these people would be assuming that the goal is to identify what I really rationally ought to do. Nevertheless, we are concerned with reasons for the agent to act in a certain way, rather than with reasons, say, for someone to want it to be the case that the agent act. Thus to be a reason in our sense is to be a consideration which has an appropriate guiding role to play in the. agents deliberation. (An agent is guided by reasons if she determines what to do in light of the reasons. ) Suppose then that a nor mative theory says that it is supremely desirable, or that it rationally ought to be the case, that agents act in a way that maximizes the general utility, but that (since the general utility is never in fact maximized by those who pay attention to it) considerations of the general utility should play no role in the agents' deliberation. Such a theory would not be said to ascribe to agents a reason to maximize the general utility on our usage. 220 pp. Englisch, Books<

1999, ISBN: 0792357000

1999 Gebundene Ausgabe Ethik, Ethos, Philosophie / Ethik, Logik, Philosophie / Logik, Ontologie, Philosophie, Philosophie des Geistes, Ethik und Moralphilosophie, Bibliography; reason; … Meer...

1999 Gebundene Ausgabe Ethik, Ethos, Philosophie / Ethik, Logik, Philosophie / Logik, Ontologie, Philosophie, Philosophie des Geistes, Ethik und Moralphilosophie, Bibliography; reason; Tradition, mit Schutzumschlag 11, [PU:Springer Netherlands; Springer Netherland]<

ISBN: 9780792357001

Reasons for Action: Toward a Normative Theory and Meta-Level Criteria Books > Philosophy > Ethics List_Books, [PU: Kluwer Academic Publishers]